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Evaluating the Impact of State Level Welfare Reform
on Female Heads of Households
Sarah Mysiewicz
Abstract: To what extent do state level wel[are policies q[[ect
single mothers in poverty? Census Bureau data is used to
determine lvhether or nol state policies are m(JVingjemale heads of
households out ofpoverty or merely 0[[o[the we![are rolls. Time
limits, thefamily cap, maximum benefits and the earned income tax
credit are independents assessed in this study.
Early claims about the success of welfare reform have been
based mostly on the number of people moved off of the welfare
rolls. Yet the question remains, are men and women who have
moved off of public assistance actually moving out of poverty?
This query is of immense importance for women because men tend
to have more success moving out of poverty (Sawhill 1976).
Research in this field is exceptionally timely considering recipients
ofTANF/AFDC are set to encounter time limit restrictions created
by the Personal Responsibility Work Opportunity Reform Act
(PRWORA, Welfare to Work) in late 2001 or early 2002 (Blank
2001, Seeeombe, Walters and James 1999). Coincidentally, the
event was concurrent with the first economic recession since the
passage of the PRWORA, allowing researchers to determine
whether or not Welfare to Work is only effective policy in times of
economic prosperity. Thus a secondary question this study
attempts to answer is whether state welfare policy is significant
even in the light of negati ve economic trends. To answer these
questions regression analysis will be run for state level data on
female heads of households with regard to four state level policies:
time limits, family caps, earned income tax credits and maximum
benefits, as well as a measure of economic control.
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Table 1: Poverty Status by Race
and Gender
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Background
To begin, it is pertinent to include some data on national
welfare statistics. When
poverty is broken down
by gender and race,
higher percentages of
women suffer from
poverty than do men
across the board (See
Table 1). Women
compnse an
"overwhelming share" of
those who receive public
aid, AFDC and TANF
recipients, often earning
only half as much income as men (Sawhill 1976, Seccombe,
Walters and James 1999, Census 2002, Census 2003). Female
recipients of TANF and AFDC earn less in wages than women
who are not receiving benefits (Table 2). On average, women who
are on TANF or AFDC earn between $472 and $738 monthly
while women who do not receive benefits earn $1554 to $1666 per
month. Table 2 shows that women on AFDC and TANF also
participate in lower percentages in the labor force than do mothers
who are not on welfare.
One central reason to examine women in poverty is
because of its effects on children. The Census Bureau's figures on
childhood poverty rates in the United States show that 17 percent
of children lived below the poverty line in 2003 and the numbers
have fluctuated around that figure since the 1980s (2002, 2003).
The number of children in poverty reached a high recently of 23
percent in 1993. These figures can be compared to the instances of
childhood poverty among female heads of households and their
dependents. In 1993, 54 percent of children living in single mother
households lived in poverty. In 2003, one out of every two children
who lived in a female headed home lived below the poverty line.
These figures make it clear that one of the best ways to address
childhood poverty is through female headship.
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One of the
focuses of welfare
reform in 1996 was the
role of the family in
instances of poverty.
These reforms can be
viewed from both an
individualist and
feminist perspective.
The individual
perspective, the belief
that poverty is a
function of personal
drive and moral integrity, is widespread. The less often voiced
opinion is that of the feminist scholars (Seccombe, Walters and
James 1999). In light of the subject of this research paper, some
background regarding United States' welfare policy from a
feminist perspective is required. This point of view is pertinent to
female headed households as it has been noted that the American
welfare system is patriarchal. Stigmas sighted as background for
this concept include the widely head belief that welfare "enables"
single mothers, who have chosen to live outside of the societal
norm (Seecombe, Walters and James 1999). As a penalty for
breaking with the traditional family structure, the work and
lifestyles of these women become devaluated. They are
discriminated against when applying for employment and are held
responsible for the collapse of the modern family. These are heavy
burdens to carry when attempting to climb out of poverty. Thus,
according to Seccombe, Walters and James, female headed
households' benefits are kept artificially low through policies such
as the family cap in order to control women who choose to live
independently (1999). Consequently, single mothers in poverty are
attempting to move out of poverty while suffering from public
scrutiny and sometimes making only half as much as male headed
households at low income jobs (Seccombe, Walters and James
1999, Blank 2002, Lichter, McLaughlin and Ribar 1997).
Upon this foundation the 1996 reforms were built. Many
aspects of the PRWORA perpetuated and broadened the patriarchal
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nature of United States' welfare policy (Seccombe, Walters and
James 1999). According to feminist political scholars the
assumption exists that women in poverty do not have the desire to
change their own circumstance. For this reason, among others,
time limits were included. Adding to new limits on the receipt of
benefits, there was a continuance of economic inequality for poor
women because they were expected to maintain employment while
suffering lower pay rates than men. Also, women were not often
taught the skills needed to compete in America's tertiary economy
or given adequate childcare to retain employment. Finally, women
and mothers at this income level are often seen as a threat to the
"traditional family ethic". Single mothers in poveliy are forced
into a double standard of working for a living under public audit
while upper and middle class women are lauded for making the
decision to stay home with their children. Even as they work poor
women have their family stmctures, living arrangements, sexuality,
moral choices and capabilities scmtinized openly.
Seen from a more moderate perspective, welfare reform
had specific aims for women and children in poveliy. Peters and
Plotnick outline the ills of the system before the PRWORA stating
these traditional benefits: encouraged divorce, delayed marriage
induced independence, and allowing fathers to evade child support
(2001). Specifically with regard to female headed households in
poverty, lawmakers worried about the rise in non-marital births. It
is from this category that an "overwhelming share" of AFDC, and
now TANF's, recipients come (Lichter, McLaughlin and Ribar
1997). Research on non-marital births has provided some
worrisome conclusions. According to Lichter, McLaughlin and
Ribar, one out of two women lives in poveliy when she chooses to
live independently over past two decades (1997). Single mothers
experience chronic poverty and, as a result, children who grow up
in these households often suffer from developmental and
behavioral problems. It was for these reasons that when the
percentage of all families with single mothers the head rose
between 1970 and 1993 from 11.54 percent to 25.9 percent, law
makers began considering legislation to encourage marriage and
decrease birthrates among women in poverty (Lichter, McLaughlin
and Ribar 1997). Female headed households are a key group of
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individuals in poverty. Their situation affects not only themselves,
but millions of children as well. Thus, it is vital to find out whether
or not Welfare to Work is effective in moving single mothers and
their dependents out ofpoverty as well as off ofwelfare.
The basic features of Welfare to Work can be split into five
categories: changes in funding, devolution of program authority to
the states, work requirements, time limits, and incentive to reduce
non-marital births (Blank 2002, Peters and Plotnick 2001, Fang
and Keane 2004, Weil and Finegold 2002, Lin 2002, Seeeombe,
Walters and James 1999). PRWORA changed national funding
from matching state funds to a block grant meaning that only a
fixed number of federal dollars would go to each state's welfare
program. Yet, states were required to maintain 75 percent pI' their
fonner spending on welfare recipients. This funding change
allowed for devolution of program authority to the states by
eliminating federal entitlements (Shaw and Liebennan 2000). It
also removed federal eligibility and rules regarding payment
(Blank 200 I). States were still accountable for two major national
directives: work requirements and time limits. While work
requirements and time limits can be handled in different ways
across the nation, there are a few rules by which all states must
abide. For example, 60 months is the limit to use federal funding
for a recipient, with a 20 percent exemption rate. States may
choose to extend payments with local monies. Work requirements
in the PRWORA state that the majority of recipients are required
to work after two years, with 90 percent of all two parent families
working by 2002 (Blank 2002, Seceombe, Walters and James
1999). Many states require mandatory job searches upon
application for benefits. Incentive to reduce non-marital births
without increasing the number of abortions is also a feature of the
reforms (Blank 2002). However, Blank notes that in this category
there is more talk than action, including a desire to legislatively
encourage marriage (2002).
Variable Choice and Previous Research
Knowing that poverty affects women and their dependents
more consistently and critically than male heads of households, it
is surprising that few empirical political research studies exist
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regarding this group. There is a wealth of knowledge available in
the sociological and anthropological fields. However, it seems that
political scientists have either focused on minority subsets in
poverty or generally avoided the issue of single mothers 1• Despite
this lack of previous study, by surveying the studies that do exist
for female headship, a few key variables out of many possibilities
became clear choices for study.
The independent variables chosen for this study include: time
limits, family caps, earned income tax credit (EITC) and maximum
benefit levels. These variables were either the most controversial
or expected to have the most effect on women in particular. Time
limits, the central tenant ofPRWORA, is the first variable used in
this study. In theOly, time limits should affect women heads of
household adversely because single mothers have the least
flexibility with childcare, little to no job training, low wages, and
extreme discrimination in hiring. Female heads of households are
often the last to be hired and the first to be fired from low wage
jobs. They have the least amount of security and therefore are
"chronically in poverty" (Lichter, McLaughlin and Ribar 1997).
The affects of time limits are not widely understood because limits
were only first imposed in 2001. However, it seems at this early
stage that the less responsive, chronic poverty suffers are those
who are most affected rather than a large population as was hoped
by legislators (Seccombe, Walters and Delores 1999, Peters and
Plotnick 2005, Blank 2002).
Family cap, also known in feminist literature as "the child
exclusion policy", is examined next (Seccombe, Walters and
Delores 1999). This policy is highly controversial. The notion
behind the cap is that when benefits are reduced or taken away
from women for having additional dependents, they will choose to
have fewer children. Often having poor access to family planning
and healthcare, this concept assumes a degree of forward thinking
and rational action that is out of character with available choices
for female heads of households (Green and Shapiro 1994).
Additionally, if we were to examine a single mothers' choice to
have additional children, the decision does not seem rational when
I This is particularly true for state level research.
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weighing costs and benefits. While a mother may receive added
income transfers', she will have additional dependents for several
decades. With the introduction of time limits, a rational acting,
forward thinking woman would mostly likely see the costs
outweighing possible financial gain. The effects of the family cap
seem to reinforce the aforementioned concepts and are cited in the
literature as either inconclusive or ineffectual (Seccombe, Walters
and Delores 1999, Walters and James, Donovan, Hovarth 1999,
Peters and Plotnick, Blank).
While the benefits ofEITC are clcarly described in the
literature, this variable is not often discussed with regard to female
heads in particular. The EITC functions as either a refundable or
nonrefundable tax credit by which low incomes can be subsidized
(Blank 1999). In theory, thc EITC rewards the "working poor" and
may be cheaper than other benefits (Blank 1999, Alstott 1995).
The EITC also has less normative stigma than traditional TANF
and AFDC benefits. As women are making more moncy now than
ever before, single mothers should benefit from this program.
The last variable used to test effects of reforms on female
heads of households is benefit levels. The political speculation is
that as benefit levels increase, the incentive to work wanes (Lichter,
McLaughlin and Ribar 1997, Blank 1999). Yet, when this concept
is considered in conjunction with literature regarding time limits, it
appears that that as benefits are decreased or kept from meeting
inflationaIY needs, those who are chronically affected by poverty
arc most likely to be affected by this change. Clearly stated,
woman heads of households are positioned to slip further into
poverty upon the decrease of traditional benefits.
This study also includes an economic control variable. The
question at hand is whether or not policies actually affect the
percentage of female heads in poverty, or if states actually have
little control over the number and type of people who live below
the poverty line. Per capita income by state was used to achieve
this measure.
1. Additional births may only increase a mother's benefits from $24-147
depending 011 the state and size of family.
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Table 3:
Change Measure:
Percentage of Female Heads in Poverty out of All People in
Poverty Year 1- Percentage of Female Heads in Poverty out
of All People in Poverty Year 2
Static Measure:
1998-2004:
Raw Number of Female Heads of Households in Poverty-;-
Raw Number of All Ages in Poverty = Percentage of
Female Heads in Poverty out of All People in Poverty
1997-1990:
Index (Avg. Raw Number Female Heads of Household
2004-1998) -;- Raw Number of All Ages in Poverty (Total
State Population *'
Percent in Poverty by State) Percent of Female Heads in
Poverty out of All People in Poveliy
average raw
number of
female heads in
poverty by state
("index,,)3. The
index was
divided by the
total population
in poverty,
devised by the
percentage in
poverty by .state multiplied by the total state population. The end
goal for both before and after 1998 was to formulate the
percentage of female heads in poverty out of the total number of
people in poverty by state (See examples in Table 3). Using a
percentage of the total poverty rate rather than a raw number kept
population influxes from interfering with the data. Additionally
Research Design and Hypotheses
This study is an exploratory investigation into the causes of
poverty among female heads of households at the state level from
1990 to 2004. It examine the effectiveness of state welfare policy
after PRWORA. The data regarding female heads of household
was collected from the Census Bureau's CPS Annual Demographic
Survey. Included in this category were "people in families with a
female householder, no husband present, with children" (US
Census Bureau 2005). These data were weighted and included
women who fell below 100 percent of the poverty. However,
because data was only available on female heads by state for 1998
through 2004, a proxy measure had to be devised. Figures for
female heads in poverty by state from 1998 to 2004 were highly
correlated. This
fact allowed for
the creation of
an index for the
3 As this measure was devised, data for the creation of Percent of Female Heads
in Poverty out of All People in Poverty by State before 1998 is available in
Appendix Section A.
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included in this research is a static measure for the depcndent and a
measure of change (See Table A). The measure for change was
created by taking the differencc of consecutive years.
Five independcnt variables wcre included. Data for state
welfare policies and maximum benefits came fi'om the Urban
Institute's Welfare Database, Health and Human Services, and
Lieberman and Shaw (2000). Family cap, EITe, and time limit
pOlicies were coded as dummy variables whereas maximum
benefits were inputtcd as raw figures. Finally, two measures for per
capita income were included, for static and change. Again, the
measure for change was devised by subtracting consecutive years.
These data came from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Four
hypotheses are examined using these variables.
Hypothesis I: States with time limits will be more like~v to
experience an increase in the percentage ()!!emale heads ()!
households in poverty as a proportion ()/those in poverty overall.
While contemporary political culture holds that time limits
will give welfare recipients incentive to find work, feminist
literature on the subject suggests that women heads of household
and those Who suffer from chronic poverty will be negatively
affected by this provision. The contention by legislators of
PRWORA and other state refonl1s is that an element of volition
exists that "welfare mothers" choose to live in poverty. However,
as previously stated female heads begin from a stagnant,
disadvantaged position. Therefore, states with harsh time limits
will only add to the number of women in povelty.
Hypothesis 2: States with family caps will be no more likely than
states witholltfamily caps to experience an increase in the
percentage o/female heads ()f household, in poverty as a
proportion ()fthose in poverty overall.
This hypothesis is in concurrence with the literature on
family caps. While this is a popular policy for states to implement,
family caps are insignificant and ineffectual.
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Hypothesis 3: States vvith EITC provisions will be less like(v to
experience an increase in the percentage oflemaIe heads of
households in poverty as a proportion o.l those in overall poverty.
EITC policies have no negative aspects. They promote
work without including any punitive provisions. If women are
given more of their earned income back, they should be able to
move out of poverty easier. The question at hand is whether or not
EITC is a significant factor towards moving women out of poverty.
Hypothesis 4: States with "lower" maximum benefits will be more
likely to experience an increase in the percentage oflemaIe heads
o.lhouseholds in poverty as a proportion o.l those in poverty
overall than states with "higher" maximum benefits.
Similar to time limits, perception of maximum benefits is
not congruent with this hypothesis. Lowering benefits is supposed
to increase personal incentive to work. However, just as is the case
with time limits, there are groups who suffer from unremitting
poverty rather than episodic cases. Female heads of households,
one of two of whom are in poverty, most often fall in the former
category. Thus, it is not logical to assume that lower maximum
benefits would decrease poverty.
Regression analysis was used to examine the effects of
state welfare policy on female heads in poverty. Two regression
models were run for each year, one using the static dependent and
one using the dependent variable representing change in
percentage of female heads of households in poveliy ("change
dependent"). 4
Data Analysis
Significance of the yearly models can be found in Table 4.
This study only explained at most 39.6 percent of the variance. The
static dependent had much higher R square measures than did the
4 Both the regression data and tables for this analysis can be found in Appendix
Section B.
Table 4: Significance of the i\lodcl
RSquare RSquare
Static Change
Year Dependent Dependent
2004 0.358 0.065
2003 0.066 0.056
2002 0.283 0.062
2001 0.396 0.032
2000 0.230 0.051
1999 0.104 0.078
1998 0.157 0.047
1997 0.139 0.083
1996 0.188 0.143
1995 0.209 0.039
1994 0.111 0.175
1993 0.041 0.200
1992 0.280 0.230
1991 0.157 0.068
1990 0.320 nla
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variable of changc in female headed households. Thc static
dependent variable ranged from explaining 4.1 percent of the
variance in 1993 to 39.6 percent in 2001. The R square of the static
dependent jumps in 2000 from an average of 17.1 percent to an
average of 31.6 percent after 2000.5 The R squarc for the change
depcndent has a smaller range, from 3.2 percent in 2001 to 23
percent in 1992. No such jump in explanation of variancc after
2000 is found in the change
depcndent.
Tables 5 and 6 show which
independent variables are
significant in the models run for
the static dcpendcnt and change
dependent regression analyses.
Again, the model for the change
dependent had fewer instances of
significance than did the static
model. Contraty to original
expectations, time limits were not
significant in any way suggesting
a trend. This variable was
significant in both models for only
one yea\", 1996. Although time
limits are the cornerstone of the PRWORA, these data suggest
limits have no significant positive or negativc cffcct on femalc
headed households. This is a noteworthy finding, especially
considcring the political importance placed on time limits'
intendcd affect on personal initiative and work ethic. Thcse data
show that time limits do not help to move singlc mothers out of
poverty in any significant way. On the other hand, thc data also
show that the vilification that time limits receive from feminist
critics and others may not be waITanted eithcr.
5 The average post 2000 is figured without the R Square for 2003. Considered an
anomaly due to the similarities of the Cases before and after it. Descriptive
statistics were nm and arc included in Appendix Section E.
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Table 5: Significant Variables, Static Dependent
Per Per
Max Time Family Capita Capita
Year Benefits Limits Cap EITC Chanqe Static
2004 0.657 0.342 0.145 0.618 0.612 0.447
2003 0.930 0.383 0.184 0.672 0.725 0.550
2002 0.510 0.356 0.909 0.906 0.375 0.503
2001 0.484 0.824 0.612 0.710 0.353 0.683
2000 0.629 0.586 0.202 0.935 0.814 0.541
1999 0.677 0.408 0.152 0.829 0.236 0.805
1998 0.835 0.446 0.866 0.509 0.334 0.720
1997 0.195 0.606 0.364 0.670 0.198 0.277
1996 0.814 0.017 0.167 0.590 0.753 0.939
1995 0.916 0.777 0.955 0.418 0.705 0.528
1994 0.625 0.531 0.166 0.408 0.073 0.690
1993 0.839 0.472 0.837 0.015 0.117 0.541
1992 0.754 n/a 0.972 0.001 0.662 0.850
1991 0.587 n/a n/a 0.478 0.727 0.134
Table 6: Significant Variables, Change Dependent
Per Per
Max Time Family Capita Capita
Year Benefits Limits Cap EITC Chanae Static
2004 0.000 0.614 0.312 0.609 0.640 0.143
2003 0.603 0.284 0.237 0.529 0.626 0.957
2002 0.001 0.311 0.724 0.275 0.540 0.009
2001 0.001 0.175 0.964 0.536 0.003 0.276
2000 0.025 0.187 0.712 0.513 0.015 0.029
1999 0.885 0.221 0.107 0.724 0.771 0.483
1998 0.078 0.078 0.405 0.999 0.110 0.025
1997 0.186 0.384 0.432 0.727 0.036 0.068
1996 0.432 0.017 0.360 0.319 0.799 0.747
1995 0.213 0.813 0.852 0.195 0.288 0.300
1994 0.381 0.817 0.797 0.585 0.853 0.236
1993 0.685 0.676 0.945 0.827 0.307 0.596
1992 0.609 n/a 0.738 0.001 0.877 0.225
1991 0.335 n/a n/a 0.623 0.370 0.015
1990 0.521 n/a n/a 0.358 0.004 0.001
Family cap was consistent with the initial hypothesis that
this policy is insignificant. There were no instances of the family
cap being significant in either the static or change model. Again,
the implications of these findings, while perhaps less unique than
95
Per Per
Max Capita Capita
Year Benefits Channe Static
2002 -0.555 0.080 0.429
2001 -0.512 0.399 0.276
2000 -0.978 -0.440 0.461
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the time limit, are consequcntial. The family cap is an increasingly
popular policy for states to enact. Yet, these data sho",! that the
family caps do not move female heads out of poverty and states arc
promoting ineffectual policy.
Contrary to the aforementioned hypothesis, EITC was a
significant factor in moving single mothers out ofpoverty. On that
note, none of the cases in the static model were significant. While
EITC was a significant variable in 1993 and 1994 for the change
model, this does not imply any significant trend. Therefore, while
EITC does not have any real drawbacks, it seems that at least in
this model EITC does not draw women out of poverty. It is
important to note, however, that many EITC programs are
federally funded and can not be captured in this type of study. It is
possible that looking at different types of earned income tax credits
might produce different types of results.
Hypothesis 4, regarding higher and lower benefits, was
correct. While years 1990 tlu·ough 1999 are insignificant for this
variable, 2000 through 2004 are significant'- This fact coincides
with a jump in the increase in explained variance Ii·om about 10
percent in 1999 to 23 percent in 2000, reaching a high of 35
percent in 2004_ Additionally, when maximum benefits are
considered in comparison to the instances of the economic
significance in 2002, 200 I and 2000 using bcta weights, maximum
benefits are stronger in each instance (See Table 7f These
Table 7: Beta Weights estion of this study: state welfare
policy, specifically maximum
benefits, are significant even in
light of economic trends.
Additionally, the B values for
these figures are all negative,
suggesting a negative
correlation between the rise in benefits and decrease in poverty.
Along with time limits, these findings are the most remarkable of
the study. Common consensus among both legislators and the
public is that raising benefits leads to higher povelty rates.
(, Again, excluding 2003 as all anomaly.
7 Sec Appendix B for extended charts on this data.
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However, these data show that higher benefits actually do the
opposite among female heads of households. Among the variables
used in this study, single mothers in the post Welfare to Work era
are doing better because of increased maximum benefits. This is
divergent from the theory behind PRWORA which rewards work
above all else and increases sanctions for those who choose not to
comply. The key finding of this study is that for a group that is
persistently affected by poverty, increasing benefits rather than
loading them with penalties is a means to decreasing poverty.
Possible objections to this project might include the use of
an index rather than raw numbers for female headed households in
poverty from 1997-1990, high con-elations of welfare policy, and
2003 as an anomaly. As previously mentioned, data for female
heads in poverty from 1998 to 2004 was highly con-elated
(Appendix C). With few fluctuations in the raw numbers, it is
likely that data from before 1998 did not vary a great deal either.
The second possible query mentioned, high correlation between
variables studied, was settled by several correlation matrices run
and included in Appendix D. The last objection was the anomaly
of 2003, as maximum benefits was not as statistically significant in
2003 as it was in the years which preceded and followed.
Descriptive statistics were run for this year and are included in
Appendix E.
Conclusion
The results of this study suggest important findings for both
legislators and feminist critics of welfare reform. Time limits, the
founding principle ofPRWORA, proved to be an insignificant
factor involved in moving female heads of households out of
poverty. Assuming that moving people out of poverty and not just
off of welfare is the ultimate goal of state policy, these data
suggest that welfare reform needs to be rethought and restructured.
Consistent with the literature, results show that the family cap,
although demonized by feminists as the "child exclusion policy"
and valorized by legislators as ending "welfare mothers'
dependency", actually has no significant effect on single mothers
in poverty. EITC, on the other hand, while also being insignificant,
proved to be contrary to original expectation. Having little
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normative stigma and support from either side of the political aisle,
EITe theoretically helps move single mothers out of poverty. The
only significant variable in this study was maximum benefits.
Raising maximum benefits has a highly negative social
connotation, although from these results it is one way of moving
women and their children out of poverty.
This is certainly not a complete explanation of poverty
among single mothers as this model only explains, at best, 39
percent of the variance. Possibilities for other independent
variables might include treatment of stepparent and grandparent
income, domestic violence provisions, pro marriage laws, and
other variables that would affect women in particular. Obviously
accessibility to more precise raw numbers for the dependent
variable would also provide a more detailed understanding of
female headship throughout this period. However, this study is a
step towards understanding the implications of state level reform
on a group that is severely impacted by poverty.
Res Publica
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